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CASENOTES
FIRST AMENDMENT-THE OBJECTIVE
STANDARD FOR SOCIAL VALUE IN
OBSCENITY CASES
Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Miller v. California,I the United States Supreme Court crafted
a three-part test for judging whether material is obscene and there-
fore unprotected by the first amendment. 2 According to the Miller
test, the fact finder must ask:
(a) whether the "average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applica-
ble state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.3
In Pope v. Illinois,4 the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the
third prong of the Miller test, namely, the value element. Consoli-
dating two unrelated obscenity prosecutions, the Court considered
whether an adjudicator must apply national or local community
standards to decide whether allegedly obscene material has redeem-
ing social value. Both trial courts had instructed the juries to use a
local standard to determine the value issue.
The Pope Court held that a fact finder must decide the value
question using an objective, reasonable person standard and not
that of the local community. 5 Only a reasonable person standard,
the Court reasoned, could effectively protect material under the first
1 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
2 Id. at 24. The first amendment provides, in relevant part: "Congress shall make
no law... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
3 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted)(quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229,
230 (1972)).
4 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987).
5 Id. at 1921 (plurality opinion).
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amendment. Because the trial courts had applied a state, not a rea-
sonable person, standard to the value question, the Supreme Court
declared the jury instructions given at the trials unconstitutional.6
The Court did not, however, automatically reverse the defend-
ants' convictions. Instead, it determined that the constitutional er-
rors in the jury instructions were subject to harmless error scrutiny.7
Therefore, the Court remanded the cases to the Illinois Court of
Appeals to determine whether the evidence in the trial records es-
tablished guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.8
The issue of community obscenity standards is not new to the
Supreme Court. Since 1957, when the Court articulated its first ob-
scenity test in Roth v. United States,9 it has considered the question of
community standards. However, until Pope v. Illinois, the standards
question had been largely a peripheral issue.' 0 Moreover, until
Pope, the Court had never focused squarely on the value element of
the Miller test, but only on the first two prongs." Thus, Pope is sig-
nificant in the evolution of obscenity law because the decision ad-
dressed the value prong and the appropriate standards for
determining value for the first time.
This Note discusses the formation of the Miller test and its sub-
sequent refinement. It examines the facts, procedural history, and
Supreme Court opinions of Pope v. Illinois. Finally, this Note ex-
plores the impact of Pope on future obscenity cases, 'ultimately con-
cluding that the decision will not significantly affect or clarify the law
of obscenity.
II. CRAFTING THE OBSCENITY STANDARD
A. FROM ROTH TO REDRUP
In Roth v. United States,' 2 the Supreme Court crafted its first ob-
6 Id. (plurality opinion).
7 Id. at 1922 (plurality opinion). According to the Court, if the trial records show on
remand that the magazines at issue were obscene beyond a reasonable doubt, the error
was harmless and the convictions should stand. Id. (plurality opinion).
8 Id. (plurality opinion).
9 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
1o See, e.g., Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962)(the Court focused on
defining "patent offensiveness" as hard-core pornography, but also stated that to deter-
mine whether material is patently offensive, a national standard should be used); Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. at 37 (the Court's holding established the three-pronged test for
obscenity, but, in dicta, the Court noted that the first two prongs of the test refer to local
standards).
S1I See infra, notes 25, 28, 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's
interpretation of the first two prongs.
12 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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scenity test. In Roth, which involved a defendant who was convicted
for mailing allegedly obscene material, the Court held that obscen-
ity is not speech at all. 13 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the first
amendment does not protect obscene material. In so holding, Jus-
tice Brennan, writing for a plurality of the Court, explicitly distin-
guished "obscenity" from material that is merely sexually-oriented
and which does enjoy constitutional protection.' 4 Justice Brennan
reasoned that "speech" does not include all utterances, and, there-
fore, all utterances are not constitutionally protected by the first
amendment.' 5 For example, he pointed to statutes that prohibited
libel and blasphemy, two offenses not protected by the first amend-
ment.' 6 By excluding obscenity from the definition of constitution-
ally protected speech, the Court established the theoretical
framework for obscenity law.
According to the Roth Court, to test whether sexually-oriented
material is legally obscene, the fact finder must ask "[w]hether to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole, appeals to
prurient interest."' 7 If the material does so appeal, it would be con-
sidered legally obscene. The Court defined "prurient" as "a shame-
ful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, [which] goes
substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or
representation of such matters."' 8 Whether the material appeals to
prurient interests, according to the Roth Court, must be determined
according to the values of an objective, reasonable person. 19 The
Court thus rejected the then-prevailing standard of Regina v. Hick-
lin,2° which allowed courts to judge material by testing the effect of
an isolated excerpt on particularly sensitive individuals. 21
Although the Roth Court clearly specified that fact finders
13 Id. at 485 (plurality opinion)("We hold that obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press.").
14 Id. (plurality opinion).
15 Id. at 486-87 (plurality opinion) (quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266
(1952)). See also F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENrrY 35-36 (1976).
16 Roth, 354 U.S. at 486-87 (plurality opinion)(quoting Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266).
17 Id. at 489 (plurality opinion).
18 Id. at 487 n.20 (plurality opinion)(quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (2)(Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1957)). An alternative definition of "prurient" offered by the Court was
"material having a tendancy to excite lustful thoughts." Id. See also Brockett v. Spokane,
472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985)(material that provokes "only normal, healthy desires" is not
obscene under the Roth standard).
19 Roth, 354 U.S. at 489 (plurality opinion).
20 L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
21 Roth, 354 U.S. at 489 (plurality opinion).
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should use the values of the average community member,22 the
Court failed to state explicitly whether it was referring to the local or
national community. However, it can be inferred that the Supreme
Court intended to use the standards of the local community. The
trial court required jurors to evaluate the impact of allegedly ob-
scene material "upon the average person in the community" using
"present-day standards of the community." 23 Becausejurors have a
local conception of their community and because the Supreme
Court approved the jury instructions verbatim, it follows that the
Supreme Court intended to use the standards of the local commu-
nity in determining whether material is obscene.
Although the Roth Court did not explicitly specify that a lack of
value must be an element in determining obscenity, the Court indi-
cated in dicta that such a requirement exists. Justice Brennan wrote
that "implicit in the history of the first amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. ' 24 How-
ever, the lack of social value of allegedly obscene material was not
part of the Roth test itself. Instead, it was a justification to exclude
obscenity from first amendment protection. 25
Five years later, in Manual Enterprises v. Day,26 the Court clarified
the question of community standards, stating that a "national stan-
dard of decency" should govern obscenity cases in order to prevent
"the intolerable consequence of denying some sections of the coun-
try access to materials, there deemed acceptable, which in others
might be considered offensive to prevailing community standards of
decency." 27 This patchwork of community standards would result,
according to Justice Harlan, if each local community enacted its own
obscenity laws. 28
In Manual Enterprises, the Court introduced the concept of "pat-
ent offensiveness," which the Court defined as material which "af-
front[s] community standards." 29 The Manual Enterprise Court
overturned the Post Office Department's declaration that three ho-
mosexual magazines were obscene. The Court derived the patent-
offensiveness standard from the requirements of the Comstock
22 Id. See also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 304 (1977); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973).
23 Roth, 354 U.S. at 490.
24 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (plurality opinion).
25 F. SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 137.
26 370 U.S. 478 (1962)(plurality opinion).
27 Id. at 488 (plurality opinion).
28 See id. (plurality opinion).
29 Id. at 482 (plurality opinion).
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Act.30 That statute prohibited the mailing of "obscene, lewd, lasciv-
ious, indecent, filthy or vile" material.3 ' In effect, according to the
Court, this language limited obscenity to hard-core pornography,3 2
a standard which was adopted by the Supreme Court in subsequent
obscenity cases.33
The Manual Enterprises test, like that of Roth, did not contain an
explicit value element. However, the Manual Enterprises Court held
that the "patent offensiveness" prong should act as a value check on
the "prurient appeal" element.3 4 The Court recognized that mate-
rial could appeal to the prurient interest without being patently of-
fensive. The Court sought to protect material which appealed to the
prurient interest but which, at the same time, had literary, scientific
or artistic value.3 5 Such material, therefore, must both appeal to the
prurient interest and be patently offensive in order to be obscene.3 6
The Court reconfirmed this point two years later injacobellis v.
Ohio,3 7 in which it reversed the conviction of the manager of a movie
theater for showing allegedly obscene films. Justice Brennan, for
the plurality, stated that the first amendment absolutely protects
work that appeals to prurient interests if the work has social value.38
According to Justice Brennan, the two elements could not be
weighed against each other. Only material that "utterly" lacks social
importance could be restricted regardless of the material's prurient
appeal.3 9 The Court confirmed that an obscenity analysis should be
based on national, not local, standards. 40
The new "utterly without value" standard became the basis of
the Court's first explicit value test. In Memoirs v. Massachusetts,4 1 the
Court reversed the condemnation of a book popularly known as
Fanny Hill. The Court stated that material is obscene only if "(a) the
dominant theme taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in
30 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1955).
31 Id.
32 See also United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973)(pat-
ent offensiveness is limited to hard-core pornography). Accord Smith v. United States,
431 U.S. 291, 303 (1977).
33 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973).
34 Manual, 370 U.S. at 487.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)(plurality opinion). Justice Brennan and Justice
Goldberg constituted the plurality injacobellis. That only two Justices joined the Court's
opinion illustrates the sharp division among the Justices on how to define obscenity.
38 Id. at 191 (plurality opinion).
39 Id. (plurality opinion).
40 Id. at 195 (plurality opinion).
41 383 U.S. 413 (1966)(plurality opinion).
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sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contem-
porary community standards relating to the description or represen-
tation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without
redeeming social value.42" The Memoirs Court stated that allegedly
obscene material must satisfy each prong of the test and, again, that
the value of a work may not "be weighed against nor cancelled by its
prurient appeal or patent offensiveness.- 43 If a work has any re-
deeming social value at all, the first amendment protects it. In ef-
fect, the Memoirs test barred only hard-core pornography.44 By
setting the value prong against the first two prongs of the test and
by using the value prong as a check on the other prongs, the Memoirs
Court set forth a fundamental tenet of first amendment jurispru-
dence: only valuable speech will be protected. The Court left open,
however, the issue of geographically-based standards, thus setting
the stage for the debate in Pope v. Illinois.
At the time of Memoirs, the. Court was divided on how to define
obscenity; this division sharpened after the decision in Memoirs. One
year after Memoirs, in Redrup v. New York, 45 the Court began a six-
year practice of reversing obscenity convictions per curiam if at least
five members of the Court, applying their separate tests, thought the
material in question was not obscene. 46 Redrup consolidated three
unrelated obscenity cases in which the defendants were convicted
for violating New York, Kentucky, and Arkansas obscenity laws, re-
spectively.47 The Court, in a cursory opinion, explained its reason
for reversing the convictions:
Two members of the Court have consistently adhered to the view
that a State is utterly without power to suppress, control, or punish the
distribution of any writings or pictures upon the ground of their "ob-
scenity." A third has held to the opinion that a State's power in this
area is narrowly limited to a distinct and clearly identifiable class of
material. Others have subscribed to a not dissimilar standard, holding
that a State may not constitutionally inhibit the distribution of literary
material as obscene unless [it meets the Memoirs test] .... Another
Justice has not viewed the "social value" element as an independent
factor in the judgment of obscenity.
Whichever of the constitutional views is brought to bear upon the
cases before us, it is clear that the judgments cannot stand. Accord-
42 Id. at 418 (plurality opinion).
43 Id. at 419 (plurality opinion).
44 See sources cited supra note 32.
45 386 U.S. 767 (1967)(per curiam).
46 See, e.g., Carlos v. New York, 396 U.S. 119 (1969)(per curiam); Henry v. Louisiana,
392 U.S. 655 (1968)(per curiam).
47 Redrup, 386 U.S. at 768-69.
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ingly, the judgment in each case is reversed.48
As the above excerpt suggests, the Redrup Court was sharply
divided on the definition of obscenity. This division and uncertainty
would not be resolved until six years later, in Miller v. California.49
B. MILLER AND ITS REFINEMENT
Seven years after Memoirs, the Supreme Court refined the tri-
partite test in Miller v. California50 and vacated the defendant's con-
viction for mailing unsolicited, sexually-explicit advertising
brochures.5 1 The Miller case was the first time a majority of the
Supreme Court agreed on a definition of obscenity since the Roth 52
decision sixteen years earlier. The Court crafted the tripartite test,
each element of which must be met, by synthesizing the obscenity
tests it had designed in previous cases. For example, the Court reaf-
firmed the rule of Roth that, to be considered obscene, a work must
appeal, as a whole, to the prurient interest of the average person,
using contemporary community standards.5 3 The Roth standard be-
came the first prong of the Miller test.5 4
The second prong, which requires that obscene material be pa-
tently offensive, was derived from the Court's decision in Manual
Enterprises and prohibits only hard-core pornography.5 5 The Court
in Miller stated that "[u]nder the holdings announced today, no one
will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene
materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive
'hard-core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating
state law, as written or construed." 56 By requiring a state statute to
prohibit specifically the type of portrayal that would be deemed ob-
scene, the Court also added a due process standard to the second
prong.
The third prong of the Miller test, the value element, repre-
sented the most significant departure from the Court's previous
tests.57 The Miller Court specifically rejected the Memoirs standard
48 Id. at 770-71 (citations omitted).
49 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 37.
52 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
53 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citing Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 27.
57 F. SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 47.
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of "utterly without redeeming social value." 58 Instead, it defined
obscene material as work, which, "taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 59
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Miller, rejected
the "utterly without value" standard of Memoirs because this stan-
dard created a "burden virtually impossible to discharge under our
criminal standards of proof."'60 Instead, Chief Justice Burger
adopted a value standard that was novel in at least three ways. First,
requiring the material "taken as a whole" to have "serious" value
allowed the fact finder to consider the intent behind the material's
dissemination. According to the Court's standard, the first amend-
ment protects material with literary, artistic, political, or scientific
content only if that content is included for a legitimate reason.6'
The standard ensured that the sham inclusion of valuable material
within an otherwise obscene work will not be sufficient to obtain first
amendment protection. Thus, no longer would "'[a] quotation
from Voltaire in the fly-leaf of a book ... redeem an otherwise ob-
scene publication.' "62
Second, the Miller test restricted the meaning of "social impor-
tance" to include works with only literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value. Although "value" should be broadly construed under
the test, the list defining social value was exhaustive. 63 The list,
however, did not include entertainment value. If it had, very little
material would fall beyond the protection of the first amendment,
because even worthless material can be a source of entertainment
for some people.
Finally, the Miller test was novel because it addressed the issue
of which standard, national or local, the fact finder should apply in
obscenity cases. The Court stated explicitly that "prurient interest"
and "patent offensiveness" are questions of fact which should be
judged according to local community standards. 64
58 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418
(1966) (plurality opinion).
59 Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418 (plurality opinion).
60 Id. at 22 (plurality opinion).
61 Id. at 24 (plurality opinion).
62 Id. at 25 n.7 (plurality opinion)(quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231
(1972).
63 F. SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 142.
64 413 U.S. at 37. See also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1977)(Pruri-
ent interest and patent offensiveness are questions of fact which the jury must resolve
using the standards of "the community as a whole." Id. at n.6). But see United States v.
Hamling, 418 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1974)("community" should be defined as the trial court's
judicial district).
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By contrast, the Miller Court did not specify which standard, na-
tional or local, applies to the value element; in fact, it failed to men-
tion any standard at all in its discussion of value. Instead, the Court
said that "[t]he First Amendment protects works which, taken as a
whole, have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, re-
gardless of whether the government or a majority of the people ap-
prove of the ideas these works represent. ' '65
By addressing the value element separately from the prurient
interest and patent offensiveness elements to which local standards
are to apply, the Miller Court implied that a community standard
other than a local standard should be used.66 However, the Court
declined to articulate a specific value standard. Thus, the Miller
Court set the stage for the Court's consideration in Pope of the ap-
propriate standards to use in the evaluation of the value element.
In Pope, the Court addressed only the issue of whether to apply
local or national community standards to the question of whether a
work has redeeming social value. It did not evaluate the meaning of
the term "value." In fact, the exact definition of "value," unlike the
definitions of "prurient interest" and "patent offensiveness," has
never been determined by the Supreme Court.67 Thus, the exact
scope of what may be considered redeeming social value remains
uncertain. Such uncertainty, in turn, endangers the due process
right of notice of criminality of those who deal with sexually-explicit
material.68
III. POPE V. ILLINOIS
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Pope v. Illinois,69 the Supreme Court considered two unre-
lated but factually similar obscenity cases, People v. Morrison70 and
65 Miller, 413 U.S. at 34; accord Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977).
66 See Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1920-21 (first two prongs of the Miller test apply a local
community standard).
67 On its face, "value" does not seem to be more self-defining than "prurient inter-
est" and "patent offensiveness." Arguably, the Miller language does provide some gui-
dance in the analysis of"value," for it specifies types of value-literary, artistic, political,
or scientific. Nonetheless, different people interpret "value" differently, just as they in-
terpret "offensiveness" or "prurience" differently. See ATr'Y GEN. REPORT OF THE COM-
MISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 155 (1970).
68 The fourteenth amendment provides, in relevant part: "No State shall... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
69 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987).
70 138 Ill. App. 3d 595, 486 N.E.2d 345 (1985).
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People v. Pope.71 In both cases, the defendants sold sexually-explicit
magazines to Illinois undercover police detectives while working as
attendants in adult book stores. 72 The defendants were charged
with the offense of "obscenity" for selling the magazines. 73
At trial, both defendants argued that the then-current version
of the Illinois obscenity statute violated the first and fourteenth
amendments because it ordered fact finders to use a local, not a na-
tional, community standard to determine the value of allegedly ob-
scene material. 74  Each trial court rejected the defendants'
assertions, instead instructing the jury to refer to the values of ordi-
nary citizens in the State of Illinois.75
The juries found both defendants guilty and both subsequently
appealed. 76 The Illinois Court of Appeals, Second District, affirmed
the convictions, again rejecting the defendants' assertions that the
issue of whether the works have value must be determined using
national, not local, community standards. 77 The Illinois Supreme
Court denied certiorari.78 The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, granted certiorari to determine the appropriate standard by
which to analyze the value element of the Miller test.79
B. THE PLURALITY OPINION
1. Establishing an Objective Standard of Value
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Powell and O'Connor, held that the fact finder must apply the stan-
dards of a reasonable person in the United States to determine the
71 138 Ill. App. 3d 726, 486 N.E.2d 350 (1985).
72 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1920 (plurality opinion).
73 Id. (plurality opinion). The then-current version of the Illinois obscenity statute
forbade selling, publishing, and participating in obscene works. According to that stat-
ute, material is obscene.
if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and if it goes substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters.
A thing is obscene even though the obscenity is latent, as in the case of undeveloped
photographs.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1 1-20(b)(1983)(amended 1986). The statute incorporated
the Roth test. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
Roth test.
74 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1920 (plurality opinion).
75 Id. (plurality opinion). The instructions stated that the jury should determine ob-
scenity using a state-wide standard instead of the "standard of any single city, town, or
region" within Illinois. Id. at 1920 n.2 (plurality opinion).
76 Id. at 1920 (plurality opinion).
77 Id. (plurality opinion).
78 Id. (plurality opinion).
79 107 S. Ct. 61 (1986).
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value of allegedly obscene material. 80 The Court maintained that
local community values applied only to the first two prongs of the
Miller test-prurient interest and patent offensiveness. 8' The Court
noted that Miller did not discuss value in terms of local standards, an
omission which the Court deemed a deliberate choice and not a
mere oversight.8 2 The Miller Court applied a different standard to
the value element, according to the Court, because, unlike prurient
interest or patent offensiveness, the literary, artistic, political, and
scientific value of material does not vary from community to com-
munity.8 3 To the Court, a local community's evaluation of allegedly
obscene material is irrelevant, because as long as material has "seri-
ous value" the first amendment protects it.84
To determine whether material has "serious value," the fact
finder must refer to the standards of a reasonable person. The
Court held that "[t]he proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary
member of any given community would find serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value in allegedly obscene material, but
whether a reasonable person would find such value in the material,
taken as a whole."8 5
The rationale underlying the Court's test is that a reasonable
person standard is the most effective way to protect a minority
group's views.86 Even if only a small minority of the population
finds value in a work, the Court reasoned, a "reasonable person"
may still conclude that the work has value.87 Thus, a work which
suffers from unpopularity could still receive first amendment protec-
tion. With a local standard, however, a juror would have to apply
the local community's standards, regardless of whether a reasonable
person would agree with her.8 8 The application of a local standard
could ban the same unpopular work which a minority of the commu-
nity found appealing. If, by objective standards, that work is valua-
ble, banning the work would violate the first amendment rights of
the minority.89
Because both trial courts had applied a state-wide standard to
the value element and rejected a national standard, the- Supreme
80 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1921 (plurality opinion).
81 Id. at 1920 (plurality opinion).
82 Id. at 1921 (plurality opinion).
83 Id. (plurality opinion).
84 Id. (plurality opinion).
85 Id. (plurality opinion).
86 Id. at n.3 (plurality opinion).
87 Id. (plurality opinion).
88 Id. (plurality opinion).
89 See id. (plurality opinion).
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Court held that the jury instructions were unconstitutional. 90 The
Court therefore vacated the opinion of the court of appeals. 9 1
2. Harmless Error Analysis
Having found the jury instructions unconstitutional, the Court
then considered whether to reverse the defendants' convictions out-
right or preserve the verdicts if the erroneous instructions were
found to be harmless error.92 According to the plurality, a constitu-
tional error is harmless and will not require automatic reversal of
the verdict "if a reviewing court concludes that no rational juror, if
properly instructed, could find value in the magazines . . .93
The Court decided not to reverse the convictions. Instead, it
remanded the case to the Illinois Court of Appeals because the un-
constitutional jury instruction did not preclude the jury from con-
sidering the value question.9 4 On remand, the court of appeals was
instructed to determine whether any rational juror, if properly in-
structed, could find value in the magazines. 9 5
The Court also declined to invalidate the repealed state statute
because even if it did so, the defendants would still be vulnerable to
another prosecution under the new statute.9 6 Even if they were ac-
quitted under the former statute, a second prosecution could occur
because the repealed statute had been interpreted as incorporating
the third prong of the Memoirs "utterly without redeeming social
value" test,9 7 a standard which required a higher burden of proof
than the one articulated in Miller.9 8 Thus, the state could prosecute
obscenity more easily under the new constitutional standards and
90 Id. at 1921 (plurality opinion).
91 Id. at 1923 (plurality opinion).
92 Id. at 1921 (plurality opinion).
93 Id. at 1923 (plurality opinion).
94 Id. at 1921 (plurality opinion).
95 Id. (plurality opinion).
96 Id. (plurality opinion). The new statute provides, in relevant part:
Any material or performance is obscene if: (1) the average person, applying con-
temporary adult community standards, would find that, taken as a whole, it appeals
to the prurient interest; and (2) the average person, applying contemporary adult
community standards, would find that it depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, ultimate sexual acts or sadomasochistic sexual acts, whether normal or per-
verted, actual or simulated, or masturbation, excretory functions or lewd exhibi-
tions of the genitals; and (3) taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 11-20 (b)(1985). The new statute became effective on
January 1, 1986.
97 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1921 (plurality opinion).
98 Id. at 1920 n.l (plurality opinion); People v. Ridens, 59 Ill.2d 362, 373, 321 N.E.2d
264, 269-70. (1974).
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the defendants could not reasonably claim that they had inadequate
notice that the state would prosecute the sale of obscene material.99
Moreover, the Court noted that simply invalidating the re-
pealed statute would not prevent the Illinois courts from applying
unconstitutional value standards in the future. 100 The Court wanted
to determine the proper value standard to prevent constitutional er-
rors in future obscenity cases. For these reasons, the Court main-
tained that invalidating the repealed obscenity statute would be
ineffective to protect the defendants' rights. 10 1
The plurality stated that the convictions did not require auto-
matic reversal because the unconstitutional jury instructions did not
necessarily constitute substantial errors. 10 2 The Court compared
the situation in Pope to that in Rose v. Clark,10 3 a recent murder case
in which a judge's erroneous instructions on the issue of malice im-
properly shifted the burden of proving malice to the defendant. 10 4
The Court applied a harmless error inquiry in Rose because it deter-
mined that the shift in the burden of proof was not fundamentally
unfair.10 5 That is, absent substantial errors, such as the denial of
counsel or bias of the adjudicator, a conviction should be affirmed
"where a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt .... "106
In Rose, the Court decided the error in the instructions lacked
fundamental unfairness and refused to reverse the verdict automati-
cally for two reasons. First, despite the error, the Court reasoned
that the jury might have considered whether the defendant had mal-
ice and, therefore, would have reached the correct verdict. 10 7 Sec-
ond, the Court reasoned that "[w]hen a jury is instructed to
presume malice from predicate facts, it still must find those facts
beyond a reasonable doubt."' 108 The Court noted that in many
cases the predicate facts establish intent, "so that no rational jury
could find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act
but did not intend to cause injury."' 1 9 According to the Court in
Rose, harmless error inquiry is to be applied as long as the trial rec-
99 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
100 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1921 (plurality opinion).
101 Id. (plurality opinion).
102 Id. (plurality opinion).
103 Id. at 1922 (plurality opinion).
104 Rose, 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986).
105 Id. at 3107 (plurality opinion).
106 Id. (plurality opinion).
107 Id. at 3107 (plurality opinion).
108 Id. at 3108 (plurality opinion).
109 Id. at 3107-08 (plurality opinion).
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ord contains facts which establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
because a jury's possible reliance on an unconstitutional presump-
tion is not a sufficient reason to vacate a conviction. 110
Applying the reasoning of Rose, the Supreme Court in Pope v.
Illinois noted that the jurors did consider facts relating to the value
issue. They had to find, among other things, that the magazines
were "utterly without redeeming social value." '11 Thus, although
the jury instructions were unconstitutional, the Court stated, "if a
reviewing court concludes that no rational juror, if properly in-
structed, could find value in the magazines, the convictions should
stand."' 12 In articulating this standard, the Court specifically over-
ruled cases decided prior to Rose which required an automatic rever-
sal if the instructions did not require the jury to consider each
element of the crime under the proper standard of proof.113
After deciding to apply the harmless error standard, the Court
indicated that it had the authority to decide whether, based on the
trial record, the constitutional error was harmless." 14 However, the
Court declined to decide that question in Pope, noting that it must
decide harmless error questions sparingly.1 15 The Court therefore
vacated the judgments and remanded the case to the Illinois Court
of Appeals to decide whether, by applying the reasonable person
standard, a rational juror could have found value in the material."16
C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's decision to remand Pope v.
Illinois for harmless error inquiry. 17 He maintained that the error
was probably harmless because he doubted that a jury which was
instructed to use a state-wide community standard would convict
the defendants but, under a reasonable person standard, would not
do so.1 18 Further, if a reviewing court determines that no rational
juror could find value in the magazines, according to Justice Scalia,
allowing the convictions to stand would not offend the defendants'
constitutional rights." 19
110 Id. at 3108 (plurality opinion)(emphasis in original).
111 Id. at 3107 (plurality opinion).
112 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1922 (plurality opinion).
113 Id. (plurality opinion).
114 Id. at 1923 n.7 (plurality opinion). Herein, the Court overruled Cabana v. Bullock,
474 U.S. 376, 384 (1986).
115 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1922-23 (plurality opinion).
116 Id. at 1923 (plurality opinion)(citing Rose, 106 S. Ct. at 3109).
117 Id. (plurality opinion).
118 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
119 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality that an objective, reason-
able person standard was consistent with the Miller test, but he as-
serted that the Miller test itself was flawed and should be
reevaluated.' 20 He stated that it is futile to try to assess objectively
the value of material because people's tastes vary so widely. Logic,
Justice Scalia said, has very little to do with aesthetics, implying that
obscenity cannot be defined at all.' 2 1 He noted, for example, that
there are "many accomplished people who have found literature in
Dada and art in the replica of a soup can.' 22
Because of this wide range of taste, Justice Scalia also criticized
the test which Justice Stevens set out in his dissent. That test re-
quires the trier of fact to ask whether a reasonable person could find
value in allegedly obscene material.' 23 The answer to that inquiry,
according to Justice Scalia, will always be affirmative because there
will always be someone who finds some value in a work.' 24 Justice
Scalia thus criticized Justice Stevens' test, although he agreed with
Justice Stevens' objectives.
D. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S PARTIAL CONCURRENCE AND
PARTIAL DISSENT
Justice Blackmun concurred with the plurality's reasonable per-
son test, stating that it stands for "the clear proposition that the
First Amendment does not permit a majority to dictate to discrete
segments of the population .... " 12 5 He stated that the reasonable
person test will effectively safeguard material deserving first amend-
ment protection because "even a minority view among reasonable
people that work has value may protect that work from being judged
'obscene.' "126 Without explaining why, however, Justice Blackmun
agreed with Justice Stevens' dissent that harmless error inquiry was
inappropriate in this case. 127
120 Id. (Scalia,J., concurring).
121 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
122 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
123 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing id. at 1927 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Justice Ste-
vens maintained that the first amendment protects material "if some reasonable persons
could consider it as having serious... value." Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting)(emphasis in
original).
124 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
125 Id. at 1924 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).




E. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens agreed with the plurality that the trial courts'
jury instructions were unconstitutional, but he dissented from the
Court's disposition of the case for several reasons. 128 First, Justice
Stevens stated that the harmless error inquiry was inappropriate
and, therefore, that the convictions should have been reversed.' 29
According to Justice Stevens, a harmless error analysis is available
only if a jury properly finds each element of the crime.130 He stated
that "[tlhe harmless error doctrine may enable a court to remove a
taint from proceedings in order to preserve a jury's findings, but it
cannot constitutionally supplement those findings." 13 1
Thus, Justice Stevens asserted that in obscenity cases, the pros-
ecution must prove the existence of each of the three elements of
the Miller test beyond a reasonable doubt. 132 In this case, however,
because of the erroneous instructions regarding value, the jury had
failed to use the correct standard of proof in considering the third
element of the test. 133 He compared this situation to a case which
held that "the constitutional right to trial by jury forbids a judge
from directing a verdict for the prosecution." 134 A jury's failure to
find one or all of the essential elements of the crime "can never
constitute harmless error," Justice Stevens concluded. 135
Justice Stevens then rejected the reasonable person standard
because it incorrectly assumes that the "reasonable person" is an
absolute standard and that all reasonable people will agree as to
which material is obscene. 136 Justice Stevens argued that reason-
able people will differ on the value question, with some reasonable
people finding value in material which other reasonable people con-
clude is worthless, and, therefore, the Court's standard offered no
real guidance to the jury.' 37 Without effective jury instructions, ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, valuable work may be banned in viola-
128 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 1925 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13o Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original.)
132 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citing United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430
U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977)).
135 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting)(citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 650 (1976);
Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 384 (1986)). The Pope plurality specifically overruled
Cabana. Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1922 n.7 (plurality opinion).
136 Id. at 1926 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
750 [Vol. 78
1988] SOCIAL VALUE STANDARD-OBSCENITY CASES
tion of the first amendment. 138
Justice Stevens offered an alternative standard, asserting that
the first amendment protects material "if some reasonable persons could
[find] serious literary[,] artistic, political, or scientific value" in it. 139
According to this standard, if anyone finds serious value in allegedly
obscene material, it should be protected. Justice Stevens argued
that this standard would prevent obscenity laws from censoring or
severely limiting the availability of material to the public. 140
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the plurality because of "in-
surmountable problems involved in [the] criminalization" of ob-
scenity. 14 1 No definition of obscenity, he stated, can adequately
notify the public about which material is legally obscene and which
is merely sexually-explicit.' 42 Justice Stevens noted that "the Con-
stitution 'requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' "143 Arbitrary and selec-
tive prosecutions, which result from a vague definition of obscenity,
decrease the effectiveness of notice that certain conduct is illegal.' 44
Justice Stevens argued that criminalizing obscene material ef-
fectively controls people's thoughts in violation of the first amend-
ment.' 45 Although he conceded that a state may regulate obscenity
for the narrow purposes of protecting minors and unconsenting
adults, he maintained that such interests do not justify the broad
criminalization of obscene material.' 46 Instead of the state deciding
for its citizens what material has value and what does not, Justice
Stevens asserted that the population as a whole should determine
the value of material.' 47 He noted that there is a high demand for
sexually-explicit material and that many well-intentioned people be-
lieve it serves a worthwhile purpose. Such a high demand indicates
that many people do in fact find value in a wide range of sexually-
138 Id. at 1927 (Stevbns, J., dissenting).
139 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original).
140 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141 See id. at 1929 n. 1l (Stevens, J., dissenting)(defining obscenity involves "insur-
mountable vagueness problems").
142 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 1928 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
357 (1983)).
144 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 1930 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969)).




explicit material. Justice Stevens maintained that only "the market-
place of ideas" should determine whether material is obscene.1 48
That is, the public, if exposed to all available types of material, will
choose that which it decides has value. Justice Stevens implied that
all regulation of worthless material should be left to the people
themselves and not to the legislatures or the courts.149
E. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S DISSENT
Justice Brennan wrote separately to reiterate his long-standing
view that any regulation of "obscene" material, with respect to con-
senting adults, does not provide sufficiently clear notice to the pub-
lic as to which material is legally obscene.' 50 Lack of clear and
specific notice, he asserted, will result in a "substantial erosion" of
first amendment rights to freedom of speech.' 5 '
Justice Brennan agreed with all of Justice Stevens' dissent, ex-
cept footnote eleven, in which Justice Stevens maintained that the
state may constitutionally regulate the sale and exhibition, in con-
trast to the legality, of both obscene and nonobscene material.' 52
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. THE DEBATE OVER STANDARDS
The debate over whether to use a national or local standard in
defining obscenity dates back to Manual Enterprises,153 in which Jus-
tice Harlan provided the first rationale for using a national standard
to evaluate obscenity cases. He argued that "a national standard of
decency" is appropriate, particularly if a federal statute is involved,
because obscenity issues affect the entire country.' 54 Absent specific
legislation requiring that local standards be applied, according to
Justice Harlan, the relevant community should be the entire
country. 15-5
This argument was echoed by Justice Brennan eleven years
148 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 1924 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1978)).
152 Id. at 1931 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citing Pope, 107 S. Ct. 1929 n. 11).
153 370 U.S. 478.
154 Id. at 488. In Manual, the Court held that the magazines at issue were not legally
obscene because they were not "patently offensive." See supra notes 31-32 and accom-
panying text for a description of how the Manual Court defined patent offensiveness.
155 370 U.S. at 488.
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later in his powerful dissent in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,' 56 in
which he stressed the importance of a clear definition of obscenity.
Only with a clear standard could the government adequately notify
people who deal with sexually-oriented material as to which material
is considered legally obscene. 157 He maintained that one uniform
national law would be easier to understand than hundreds of local
laws and would provide more effective notice of the law as required
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 58
In Jacobellis v. Ohio,159 Justice Brennan articulated perhaps the
strongest argument that has been made to support a national stan-
dard. 160 Stating that "it is, after all, a national constitution we are
expounding,"' 16 1 he maintained that laws applying local standards
would threaten all citizens' first amendment rights of free expres-
sion. Obscenity statutes in one locale, he argued, would have a chil-
ling effect on communities elsewhere. 162 If members of one
community knew that people had been prosecuted in a nearby com-
munity for dealing with certain sexually-explicit material, they might
decide not to deal with that material in their own town for fear of
prosecution. 163 Distributors of sexually-oriented material, said Jus-
tice Brennan, would not risk a criminal conviction simply to test the
different obscenity laws in the two communities. 164 For that reason,
he noted, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to "tolerate a
result whereby 'the constitutional limits of free expression in the
Nation would vary with state lines.' "165
Justice Brennan's argument assumes that a national standard
will be generally more permissive than local standards. 166 If the na-
tional standard were stricter than local ones, the national standard
would effectively restrict rather than promote the availability of sex-
ual material and would thereby frustrate Justice Brennan's goal of
relatively free expression. Similarly, Justice Brennan considered the
effect only of a community with strict standards relative to its neigh-
bors; he failed to analyze the converse situation, namely, the poten-
156 413 U.S. 49, 78 (1973)(Brennan,J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453
(1939)).
159 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
160 Id. at 195.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 194.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 194-95 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946)).
166 Id. at 193.
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tially expansive effect of a community's permissive standards on its
neighbors. 167 As one commentator noted, however, this latter dan-
ger is probably illusory because a community whose citizens have
generally permissive values regarding sexual material would be un-
likely to prosecute its distribution, even if the material were legally
obscene. 168 It would not be worthwhile for that community to pros-
ecute material if it were not in reality considered offensive or harm-
ful. A lack of local prosecution would not affect local inhabitants'
behavior; therefore, there would be no risk of an expansive effect.
In Miller v. California,'69 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
majority, rejected the national standard for the first two prongs of
the Miller test and instead held that fact finders must apply a state-
wide community standard. 170 He maintained that there is no ascer-
tainable national obscenity standard because values regarding ob-
scenity vary widely from locale to locale. 171 Chief Justice Burger
admitted that the scope of first amendment protection must be uni-
form in the nation, but he maintained that the factual determination
of contemporary community standards could be based on local stan-
dards. 172 He stated that
[u]nder a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limita-
tions on the powers of the States do not vary from community to com-
munity, but this does not mean that there are, or should or can be,
fixed, uniform national standards .... To require a State to structure
obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national "community stan-
dard" would be an exercise in futility. 173
ChiefJustice Burger noted that even if a uniform standard were
formulated, jurors would not necessarily apply it. 174 Traditionally,
he said, jurors use their local community's standards, qualified by
the judge's limiting instructions and would be unable to apply an
"abstract [national] formulation."' 175
Further, Chief Justice Burger rejected a national standard be-
cause he believed it would stifle the local diversity of the nation. He
stated:
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
167 Id. at 194. See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 n.13 (1973).
168 F. SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 121.
169 413 U.S. at 24.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 30. This view was first articulated by ChiefJustice Warren in his dissent in
Jacobellis, 378 U.S. 184, 199-203 (1964)(Warren, CJ., dissenting).
172 413 U.S. at 30.
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Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi ac-
cept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or New
York City .... People in different States vary in their tastes and atti-
tudes and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of im-
posed uniformity. 176
Chief Justice Burger's argument in Miller favoring a local stan-
dard explicitly addressed only the prurient interest and patent of-
fensiveness elements of the tripartite test, not the value element.
However, the arguments he uses are the same ones that other Jus-
tices have used to support local standards with regard to obscenity
in general.1 77 Therefore, ChiefJustice Burger's statements are use-
ful because they articulate the point of view of those who favor local
community standards for determining value.
Ultimately, of course, the Supreme Court in Pope v. Illinois held
that the fact finder must use an objective national standard-that of
the reasonable person-to decide the value question.178 After Pope,
the fact finder in obscenity cases must judge the value of material
based on how the average American would evaluate it, not on the
basis of her own personal opinion.' 79
Exactly what values the reasonable person embodies may be
difficult to determine, however, because the reasonable person in
obscenity cases may not be the same reasonable person in other
cases, such as tort actions. In tort cases, the reasonable person is
not average.' 80 She has superior judgment and personifies "a com-
munity ideal of reasonable behavior . "8... 11 In obscenity cases,
however, the standard is used to gauge what might be termed a per-
son's weaknesses for sexually-explicit material, 182 as many people con-
sider an affinity for sexual material to be a weakness.' 83
Because the reasonable person in obscenity cases has both the
strengths and the weaknesses of an average person, she may provide
a relatively realistic standard of behavior. Given the realistic quality
of the standard, then, the outcome of an obscenity case using a rea-
sonable person test should be predictable, especially in comparison
176 Id. at 32-33.
177 See, e.g., Smith, 431 U.S. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 506-07 (1957)(Harlan, J., dissenting). Although Justice Harlan advocated a
local standard in Roth, he later changed his position in Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S.
478, 488 (1962).
178 107 S. Ct. at 1921.
179 Id.
180 F. SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 73.
181 W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (5th ed. 1984).
182 See Smith, 361 U.S. at 172 n.3 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
183 See F. SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 73.
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to cases which use a local standard. This predictable outcome is
not, however, necessarily the case. A national standard may not
produce an outcome that differs at all from the use of another
standard.
In theory, the use of a national reasonable person standard
would produce an outcome which differs from the use of a local
standard to determine whether material is obscene. For example,
jurors in Berkeley, California would probably judge sexually-explicit
material differently from jurors in Birmingham, Alabama. 184 Using
local standards, juries from the two communities would therefore
resolve the value issue differently. Under a national standard, how-
ever, the juries would have to apply the same value standard and
would therefore resolve their cases identically.
In practice, however, it is doubtful that the choice of tests
would have a significant impact. Jurors are likely to find it difficult
to apply an abstract national standard because the issues in obscen-
ity cases differ significantly from those in other cases.' 8 5 Obscenity
is uniquely linked to strongly held, emotionally-charged local values,
such as religion,18 6 which is perhaps the strongest determinant of
people's attitudes toward all issues, including obscenity.'8 7 Other
local factors which affect people's attitudes towards obscenity in-
clude education, economic status, and occupation.' 8 8
Lessons about sex and morality begin at an impressionable
early age from parents and from religious and secular schools.18 9
Because exposure to these concepts starts at such a young age and
because the concepts are internalized over a long period of time,
people's opinions on pornography and obscenity are deeply en-
grained. 190 Thus, it seems unlikely that a juror could immediately
transcend local community norms and values which have been inter-
nalized over several decades, merely because of ajudge's instruction
184 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 32-33.
185 F. SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 73-75.
186 ATr'Y GEN., COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL REPORT 237-244 (1986)[hereinafter
COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY].
187 Fago & Bonora, Conducting the Voir Dire, in THE CARE AND FEEDING OFJURORS, Tab
4, 174 (1980)(citing G. LENSKI, THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR 45 (1977)). See also H. FEILD & L.
BIENIEN, JURORS AND RAPE 95-99 (1980).
188 ATr'Y GEN., REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON OBSCENITY 356 (1970).
189 Berger, Gagnon & Simon, Urban Working-Class Adolescents and Sexually Explicit Media,
in 9 ATr'Y GEN. TECHNICAL REPORTS OF THE COMMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOG-
RAPHY, 209, 247-48 (1970) [hereinafter TECHNICAL REPORTS]. See also COMM'N ON POR-
NOGRAPHY, supra note 187, at 339-40.
190 See Zurcher & Kirkpatrick, Collective Dynamics of Ad Hoc Anti-Pornography Organiza-
tions, in 5 TECHNICAL REPORTS, supra note 190, at 91-106.
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to use a national value standard. 191 Even if the juror tried to do so,
morality is too deeply entrenched to be put aside during a trial. As
Justice Stevens stated in Smith v. United States, "[i]n the final analysis,
the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant in an obscenity trial is
determined primarily by individual jurors' subjective reactions to
the materials in question rather than by the predictable application
of rules of law."' 192
The tendency ofjurors to apply their local standards is consis-
tent with the fact that juries are local institutions. The only trait that
all jurors in a particular case will have in common is where they live.
In fact, lawyers will often choose whether to have a jury trial based
on the location of the trial. 193 Defense attorneys might, for exam-
ple, waive the right to ajury in an obscenity case if they perceive the
community to be conservative. This tactic indicates that many trial
lawyers believe jurors generally vote consistently with the values of
their local community. 194
The personal nature of obscenity issues, coupled with peer
pressure among jurors, may also affect the jury's deliberative pro-
cess.' 95 Because obscenity is such a sensitive subject, a juror may
react differently to the same material, depending on whether she is
in a private or public setting.' 96 As Justice Stevens stated, one ju-
ror's opinion "will inevitably influence the perceptions of other ju-
rors," particularly those who find the material appealing but
perceive that they are in the minority and are hesitant to articulate
their view. 197
Moreover, at least one study has shown that most people be-
lieve that they are more permissive than others with regard to sexu-
ally-oriented material.' 98 A juror's perception that she is more
permissive than her peers might make her hesitant to speak favora-
bly about the sexually-explicit material.
In sum, jurors will probably not apply a national value standard
191 But see, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED
STATES, FINAL REPORT 99 (June 1977)(prejudices about legal issues are "minimized or
equalized" when questions are submitted to jurors because juries encompass a cross-
section of the community).
192 Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 316 (1977)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
193 See Smith & Locke, Problems in Arrests and Prosecutions for Obscenity and Pornography, in
5 TECHNICAL REPORTS, supra note 190, at 54.
194 Id.
195 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 164 (1974)(Brennan, J., concurring);
accord Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974).
196 Smith, 431 U.S. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198 Abelson, Cohen, Heaton & Suder, National Survey of Public Attitudes Toward and Expe-
rience With Erotic Materials, in 5 TECHNICAL REPORTS, supra note 190, at 84.
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that differs from their own local one. Moreover, the standard they
do apply is likely to be linked to the standards that they perceive
their fellow jurors will apply. It is difficult, if not impossible, to pre-
dict exactly which standards a juror will use in obscenity cases. As a
result, judicial insistence on a national standard may well be futile.
The impact of Pope v. Illinois on the law of obscenity, therefore,
is questionable, particularly in light of the Court's decision to sub-
ject the case to harmless error inquiry.1 99 In so doing, the Supreme
Court in effect instructed the appeals court to determine whether
the choice of a reasonable person standard over the local standard,
which the trial courts used, leads to a finding that the works had
value and were therefore not obscene. 200 If, under a reasonable
person standard the lower court determines that the works are not
obscene, it must set aside the defendants' convictions. If, however,
the court finds that the application of the local standard had no sub-
stantial effect on the value determination, the convictions must
stand.20 1 Because of the practical reality of the jury deliberation
process,20 2 the convictions will probably survive the harmless error
inquiry.
B. HARMLESS ERROR
The Supreme Court first articulated the harmless error rule in
Chapman v. California,203 holding that not all constitutional errors re-
quire an automatic reversal of the trial verdict if the errors are so
insignificant that they may be deemed harmless. 20 4 In criminal
cases, if a reviewing court holds that a constitutional error was com-
mitted at trial, it may not set aside the conviction if it determines,
after considering the whole record, that the error was "harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt. '205 The Chapman Court stated, however,
that an error is harmless only if it did not contribute to the final
verdict. 20 6 If there is even "a reasonable possibility" that the mis-
take contributed to the conviction, the error is not harmless and the
199 107 S. Ct. at 1921 (plurality opinion).
200 Id. at 1922 (plurality opinion).
201 Id. (plurality opinion).
202 See supra notes 186-99 and accompanying text.
203 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
204 Id. at 22. Although Congress codified the harmless error rule in 1919, see Act of
Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 stat. 1181 (currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982)), not
until Chapman did the Court decide whether a constitutional error could ever be consid-
ered "harmless." See The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Leading Cases [hereinafter Leading
Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 100, 107 (1986).
205 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
206 Id.
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conviction must be set aside.20 7
In Hamling v. United States,208 a case closely analogous to Pope,
the Supreme Court significantly modified the standard set forth in
Chapman. The Hamling defendants were convicted of mailing and
conspiring to mail an obscene brochure. The trial judge, applying
the Miller test, erroneously instructed the jury to refer to a national
standard instead of a local one to determine whether the material
was patently offensive. 20 9
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge should have used a
local standard, but it concluded that "reversal is required only
where there is a probability that the excision of the references to the
'nation as a whole' ... would have materially affected the delibera-
tions of the jury." 210 The Court upheld the convictions, reasoning
that the erroneous instructions had not "materially affected" the
jury's deliberations because of the "confusing and often gossamer
distinctions between 'national' standards and other types of
standards." 211
Recently, the Court broadened further the application of the
harmless error analysis. In Delaware v. Van Arsdall,21 2 for example,
the Court extended the harmless error analysis to violations of a
defendant's right to cross-examine an adverse witness. 21 3 In Van Ar-
sdall, the trial judge prohibited the defense counsel from cross-ex-
amining a testifying witness in the presence of the jury, which
ultimately convicted the defendant of first-degree murder.2 14 The
Court determined that the trial judge had violated the defendant's
right to cross-examine an adverse witness but concluded that the
denial of the opportunity to cross-examine is not prejudicial in every
case.215 The Court therefore remanded the case for a harmless er-
ror analysis. 216
In Rose v. Clark,21 7 the Court further expanded the application
of the harmless error analysis to include erroneous jury instructions
207 Id. at 23.
208 418 U.S. 87, 108 (1974).
209 Id. In Miller, the Supreme Court ruled that patent offensiveness must be judged
according to local standards. Miller, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
210 Hamling, 418 U.S. at 108.
211 Id. at 109.
212 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986).
213 According to the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution, "in all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
214 Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. at 1434.
215 Id. at 1437.
216 Id. at 1438.
217 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986).
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on the alleged malicious intent of the defendant, who was convicted
of murder. In Rose, the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury
that "[a]ll homicides are presumed to be malicious in the absence of
evidence which would rebut the implied presumption." 218 Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, declined to classify erroneous jury
instructions as errors which require automatic reversal because they
do not "necessarily render a trial unfair." 2 19 Such reversible errors
are "the exception and not the rule." 220 Justice Powell wrote that
"if the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudi-
cator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may
have occurred are subject to harmless error analysis." 221
The Court in Rose held that an error is harmless if the trial rec-
ord establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.2 2 2 It reasoned that
if the record remains intact, a reviewing court will be able to deter-
mine whether the erroneous instruction harmed the defendant's
case.2 23 An erroneous jury instruction, the Court said, does not dis-
turb the "composition of the record." 224
In effect, the standard that the Rose Court articulated estab-
lishes that as long as the trial record reveals sufficient evidence of
guilt, a reviewing court does not have to consider the constitutional
fairness of the trial proceedings. If the reviewing court believes that
the record supports a conviction, despite procedural errors, the
conviction must stand. Such an outcome-oriented perspective could
violate the defendant's constitutional rights to a jury trial and the
tenets of procedural due process.225 In harmless error analysis, the
appellate court reviews the record and uses its own discretion to
determine whether the state established guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Essentially, the court must engage in factual review of the
evidence in the record, which is a task properly delegated to the
jury. 22 6
If the reviewing court affirms the conviction, despite a constitu-
tional error at trial, the defendant potentially suffers two constitu-
tional violations. The first occurs at trial when the judge gives
218 Id. at 3104.
219 Id. at 3106.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 3107.
222 Id.
223 Id. at n.7.
224 Id.
225 The sixth amendment guarantees the "right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury .... U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The fourteenth amendment guarantees all
citizens' due process. See supra note 69 for the text of the fourteenth amendment.
226 See Leading Cases, supra note 205, at 116.
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erroneous jury instructions, as in Pope;227 the second violation oc-
curs on appeal, when the appellate court reviews facts which are
properly in the realm of the jury.2 28 As Justice Blackmun stated:
[T]he question a reviewing court must ask is not whether guilt may be
spelt out on a record, but whether guilt has been found by a jury ac-
cording to the procedures and standards required by the Constitution
.... When a jury has not been properly instructed concerning an
essential element of the offense that has been charged, the danger ex-
ists that the defendant has been deprived of his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to have a jury determine whether the State has
proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 229
In Pope, however, the Supreme Court specifically overruled pre-
vious cases which held that a conviction can never stand if the jury
instructions do not require the jury to find each element of the
crime under the proper standard of proof.23 0 Therefore, although
the value element of the obscenity test was not found under the
proper standard of proof, the convictions, according to Pope and
Rose, may stand. Furthermore, in light of Hamling,23' which allowed
a guilty verdict to stand despite an erroneous instruction on obscen-
ity standards it is extremely unlikely that the Illinois Court of Ap-
peals will reverse the convictions in Pope.
V. CONCLUSION
After Pope, fact finders must apply a reasonable person standard
to determine whether allegedly obscene material has redeeming so-
cial value. Successful application of the reasonable person standard
is unlikely, however, given the local orientation of both the jury pro-
cess and obscenity issues. Opinions on obscenity are closely linked
to religion, education, and economic status, which, in turn, produce
strongly engrained values with bonds to the social fabric of the local
community. Moreover, because obscenity is a sensitive, personal is-
sue, jurors may choose to disregard a reasonable person standard if
they believe it is wrong or immoral. Thus, the Court's choice of a
national instead of a local standard will not have a significant impact
on future obscenity prosecutions.
Further, the Court's decision in Pope to remand the case for a
harmless error inquiry means that the verdicts will probably stand,
despite the trial court's unconstitutional value instructions. It is un-
227 See, e.g., Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1921.
228 Leading Cases, supra note 205, at 116.
229 Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3115-16 (1986)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
230 107 S. Ct. at 1922 n.7.
231 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
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likely that the lower court will rule that the error materially affected
the trial record. For all the reasons discussed above, using a reason-
able person standard instead of a local community standard, in prac-
tice, does not have a substantial impact on an obscenity case. In
sum, the Supreme Court's decision in Pope v. Illinois will substan-
tially impact neither the evolution of obscenity law nor the outcome
of this particular case.
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